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█ Abstract Frege’s remarks about the first-person pronoun in Der Gedanke have elicited numerous com-
mentaries, but his insight has not been fully appreciated or developed. Commentators have overlooked 
Frege’s reasons for claiming that there are two distinct first-person senses, and failed to realize that his 
remarks easily generalize to all indexicals. I present a perspectival theory of indexicals inspired by Frege’s 
claim that all indexical types have a dual meaning which, in turn, leads to a duality of senses expressed by 
indexical tokens. 
KEYWORDS: Indexicals; First Person; Perspective; Senses 
 
█ Riassunto La doppia natura degli indessicali: una posizione fregeana – Le osservazioni di Frege sul pro-
nome di prima persona contenute in Der Gedanke hanno sollevato numerosi commenti, ma le sue intui-
zioni non sono state pienamente comprese o sviluppate. I commentatori di Frege hanno trascurato le ra-
gioni per le quali egli sosteneva che ci sono due distinti sensi della prima persona e non hanno colto come 
queste sue osservazioni possono essere facilmente estese a tutti gli indessicali. Intendo presentare qui una 
posizione prospettivista sugli indessicali, ispirata dall’affermazione di Frege per cui tutti i tipi di indessica-
li hanno un doppio significato che, a sua volta, porta a una doppia natura dei sensi espressi dalle occorren-
ze indessicali. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Indessicali; Prima persona; Prospettiva; Sensi 
 

█  Dr. Lauben’s private “I” 
 
 GOTTLOB FREGE DID NOT ADDRESS the 
topic of indexicals in any systematic way, but 
the few remarks he did make, notably, in his 
1918 essay, Der Gedanke, have not been fully 
appreciated, despite numerous commen-
taries. Here I will develop a theory of indexi-
cals suggested by his intriguing treatment of 
the Dr. Lauben example. I hasten to add that 
this is not a paper in Fregean scholarship, 
and I will not speculate whether Frege’s 
claims about the first-person pronoun can be 
reconciled with his other theses concerning 
language and thought.  
The occasion for Frege’s remarks was an 
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extended discussion of thoughts. Frege noted 
several properties of a thought (Gedanke), 
among which are the following: 
 
► A thought is that for which the question 
of truth and falsity arises. 
 
► A thought is the sense of a sentence in the 
indicative mood which, in turn, expresses 
the thought. 
 
► A thought is also a content (Inhalt) of 
thinking, that is, it is something that can 
be grasped, entertained, or apprehended. 
 
► Thoughts are neither ideas internal to 
consciousness nor external material 
things, but entities of a “third realm”. 
  
► Thoughts are objective, that is, their ex-
istence does not depend upon being ap-
prehended.1 
 
From Uber Sinn und Bedeutung, we also 
know that 
 
► The senses of singular terms occurring 
within a sentence expressing a thought are 
components of the thought expressed 
(This follows from the Fregean composi-
tionality principle for senses and from the 
fact that the sense of a sentence depends 
upon the senses of its component terms). 
 
► A thought is about an object only insofar 
as the object satisfies a sense contained 
within the thought.  
  
To these should be added a negative the-
sis, namely, 
  
► Any object a thought is about – the refer-
ent of any singular term in a sentence ex-
pressing that thought – is not itself a 
component of the thought. 
 
Two of Frege’s arguments for the latter 
are familiar. First, if referents were parts of 
thoughts, then there would be no way to dis-
tinguish between the following pair: 
 
3+4 = 7 
 
81 = 7  
 
or between, 
 
The author of Anna Karenina was Russian  
 
The author of War and Peace was Russian 
 
Yet, each pair involves different thoughts. 
Second, some thoughts are about external 
material objects, e.g., Mount Etna, but if this 
object were part of a thought then «each in-
dividual piece of frozen solidified lava» 
would also be part of the thought, and that, 
to Frege, is «absurd».2 Sentences containing 
indexicals pose problems. Since knowledge of 
the context is needed to correctly apprehend 
the thought expressed by such sentences, for 
example, “Today, it is raining” or “I am 
here”, then such sentences by themselves do 
not suffice for the full expression of a 
thought.3 This dependence upon context 
shows that the lexical meaning of an indexi-
cal does not, by itself, serve as an individuat-
ing sense of a singular term, for tokens of an 
indexical type have a constant meaning in all 
contexts yet vary in their reference. To retain 
the principle that reference occurs via an ex-
pressed sense, Frege realized that contextual 
elements are needed for the complete expres-
sion of the thought. 
  
Thus, the contents of a sentence often go 
beyond the thoughts expressed by it. But 
the opposite often happens too, that the 
mere wording, which can be grasped by 
writing or the gramophone does not suffice 
for the expression of the thought […] If 
someone wants to say the same today as he 
expressed yesterday using the word “today”, 
he must replace this word with “yesterday”. 
Although the thought is the same its verbal 
expression must be different so that the 
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sense, which would otherwise be affected by 
the differing times of utterance, is re-
adjusted. The case is the same with words 
like “here” and “there”. In all such cases the 
mere wording, as it is given in writing, is not 
the complete expression of the thought, but 
the know-ledge of certain accompanying 
conditions of utterance, which are used as 
means of expressing the thought, are need-
ed for its correct apprehension. The point-
ing of fingers, hand movements, glances 
may belong here too.4 
 
Although Frege did not speak in terms of 
linguistic or lexical meaning, one proposal is 
that the sense of an indexical token in a given 
utterance is fixed by the meaning of an in-
dexical type in combination with various “ac-
companying conditions of utterance”. The 
lexical meaning, in turn, may be viewed as a 
template that yields a sense upon being com-
pleted with these conditions. 
Having noted the relevance of context in 
interpreting indexicals, Frege went on to say 
that the occurrence of the word “I” gives rise 
to some questions.5 Consider the case of Dr. 
Gustav Lauben who said, 
 
(1) I have been wounded. 
 
Suppose that a second person, Leo Peter, 
who heard Dr. Lauben’s utterance, subse-
quently remarked, 
 
(2)  Dr. Gustav Lauben has been wounded. 
 
Suppose further that a third person, Ru-
dolf Lingens, heard the utterance of both 
these sentences without knowing that Dr. 
Lauben was the speaker of (1). Frege writes, 
 
if both Leo Peter and Rudolph Lingens un-
derstand by “Dr. Lauben " the doctor who 
lives as the only doctor in a house known to 
both of them, then they both understand 
the sentence “Dr. Gustav Lauben has been 
wounded” in the same way, they associate 
the same thought with it.6 
However, since Lingens does not know 
that it is Dr. Lauben who uttered (1), Frege 
concludes that what Lingens understands in 
processing Dr. Lauben’s (1) is not what he 
understands by processing Leo Peter’s (2). 
Frege concluded, «the thought which Leo 
Peter expresses [with (2)] is not the same at 
that which Dr. Lauben uttered [with (1)]».  
Further, noting that a singular term can 
be associated with different senses for differ-
ent users, if Herbert Garner does not associ-
ate the same sense with ‘Dr. Lauben’ that 
Lingens does, then Leo Peter’s utterance of 
(2) does not express the same thought to 
Garner as it does to Lingens. More interest-
ingly, not only do (1) and (2), as heard by 
Lingens, express different thoughts, Frege 
claimed that what Leo Peter and Lingens un-
derstand by (1) is not the thought that Dr. 
Lauben himself apprehends in uttering (1). 
 
Now everyone is presented to himself in a 
particular and primitive way, in which he 
is presented to no-one else. So, when Dr. 
Lauben thinks that he has been wounded, 
he will probably take as a basis this primi-
tive way in which he is presented to him-
self. And only Dr. Lauben himself can 
grasp thoughts determined in this way. 
But now he may want to communicate 
with others. He cannot communicate a 
thought which he alone can grasp. There-
fore, he must use the “I” in a sense which 
can be grasped by others, perhaps in the 
sense of “he who is speaking to you at this 
moment”, by doing which he makes the 
associated conditions of his utterance 
serve for the expression of this thought.7 
 
A lot is packed into this intriguing passage. 
The concluding sentence points out that if Dr. 
Lauben uses “I” with a sense that can be 
grasped by other, as with that expressed by 
“he who is speaking to you at this moment”, 
then what Lingens understands by Lauben’s 
utterance of (1) is better expressed as 
 
(3)  The speaker of the utterance of (1) has 
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been wounded. 
 
In John Perry’s words, (3) expresses a reflex-
ive content of (1) because it is a condition on 
(1), and it is true if and only if (1) is true.8 As-
suming the point can be generalized, then Fre-
ge’s words suggest a principle of the following 
sort: 
 
(FP)  In producing a token t of the first-
person pronoun to communicate 
with others by means of an utter-
ance U, one uses t with a sense that 
can be grasped by others, namely, 
as the speaker of U. 
 
This principle illustrates how a linguistic 
meaning of “I” is a template for specifying 
the reference-determining sense, namely,  
 
the speaker of utterance U 
 
which is completed upon identifying a 
particular utterance.9  
The first three sentences of Frege’s pas-
sage indicate that a sense of this sort is not 
what is operative in the genesis of Dr. Lau-
ben’s self-presenting thought. Because of 
their publicity, and because they include an-
other sense for identifying U, instances of the 
(FP)-template do not qualify as the “primi-
tive and private way” through which Dr. 
Lauben is presented to himself. The latter, 
together with the predicated material ex-
pressed by “is wounded”, determines an 
equally private thought that is distinct from 
that expressed by either (2) or (3). By all ap-
pearances, then, Frege felt that there are two 
senses and two thoughts that accompany a 
speaker’s use of the first-personal pronoun, 
one private and the other public. It follows 
that the first-person pronoun has more than 
one meaning, that (FP) cannot be its only 
governing principle, and that communication 
with others is not its sole function.  
What other function could the first-
person pronoun serve? Why did Frege make 
this distinction between first-person modes 
or senses?  
We need not look far for answers. Prior to 
the Dr. Lauben passage, Frege made a three-
fold distinction in attitudes toward a 
thought, namely, 
 
1. the apprehension (Fassen) of a thought – 
thinking; 
 
2. the recognition of the truth of a thought – 
judgment; 
 
3. the manifestation of this judgment – as-
sertion.10 
 
That this is a chronological ordering is indi-
cated by Frege’s subsequently referring to the 
apprehension as the «first act» and then say-
ing that the recognition of a thought’s truth-
value comes afterwards. Effectively, a speaker 
apprehends a thought before judging it, and 
asserts it only subsequently to judging it.11  
Factoring in communication and, thus, an 
audience (hearer, reader), further attitudes 
must be acknowledged, specifically,  
 
4. the speaker’s communicational intention, 
that is, what the speaker intends to com-
municate through the utterance; 
 
5. the audience’s apprehension of the utter-
ance and its relevant contextual features; 
 
6. the audience’s interpretation of the asser-
tion. 
 
If communication is successful, interpreta-
tion results in apprehending information that 
the speaker intended to convey. 
Notice what these distinctions indicate. 
First, the self-presenting thought initially ap-
prehended by Dr. Lauben was not something 
he came to apprehend by processing the utter-
ance of (1). That is, he did not first witness 
his own utterance of (1), identify himself as 
its speaker, and then apprehend what he sub-
sequently asserted with (1). This would be 
putting the interpretive cart before the pro-
Indexical Duality: A Fregean Theory  
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ductive horse. Could he have identified the 
utterance before performing it? Perhaps, but 
by what means? Presumably by some descrip-
tion. But which? If, say, as the utterance I am 
about to make, he would already be thinking 
of himself in first-person terms, in which case 
(3) would be of no use in explaining his initial 
first-person thought. Nor would it do for Dr. 
Lauben to identify the utterance as the utter-
ance Dr. Lauben is about to make, for Dr. 
Lauben might not have thought of himself as 
“Dr. Lauben,” and for this reason, (2) does 
not accurately represent Dr. Lauben’s initial 
thought either. Nor would any other second 
or third person description that he uniquely 
satisfies do the trick. Finally, it will not do if 
he were to identify the utterance as the utter-
ance Leo Peter will soon hear, because this 
would not yield a self-presenting thought.12 
 Second, given that a sense is the way in 
which an object is given, cognized or identi-
fied, then some sense, specifically, one that en-
sures reflexive identification, is needed to ex-
plain how Dr. Lauben initially thought of him-
self and formed intentions to com-municate 
about himself. The (FP)-instances are mani-
fested only in interpretation or in the for-
mations of intentions to communicate with 
“I”. To communicate that he was wounded, 
Dr. Lauben first had to identify himself so that 
he could then form an intention to convey in-
formation about himself, and (FP)-instances 
do not provide a suitable mode. A self-
presenting mode is required for Dr. Lauben to 
realize facts about himself, a realization that 
can obviously occur without any concern for 
communication, as when we imagine Dr. Lau-
ben alone in his house. Since such a mode is 
what occasions the actions of identifying, ap-
prehending, intending, and uttering, let us 
speak of it as executive first-person sense. In-
stances of the (FP)-template, by contrast, are 
interpretive first-person senses.13 
Third, if we acknowledge a duality of first-
person senses, then there is also a duality of 
thoughts expressed by first-person means. Dr. 
Lauben’s initial thought differs from that 
which he intends his hearer to understand, 
namely, that containing the interpretive he 
uses to “communicate with others”. Both 
thoughts may differ from the thought that 
terminates the hearer’s interpretation of the 
utterance insofar as the hearer uses the in-
stance of the FP-template as a route to figur-
ing out who the speaker is. For example, per-
haps Leo Peter came to think (2) by way of 
first apprehending (3). In any case, it is mis-
leading to speak of the thought or proposition 
associated with a first-person utterance.14 
Distinguishing two meanings for the first-
person, and correspondingly, two types of 
senses, one of which is executive, private, and 
pre-utterance, and the other of which is in-
terpretive, public, and post-utterance, poses 
questions that Frege did not address. Fore-
most among them are the following: 
 
► Do executive senses of the first-person 
pronoun also incorporate element of con-
text? If so, what sort of contexts and what 
contextual features are needed to secure 
reference determining senses? 
 
► Why are the executive senses of the first-
person pronoun private? 
 
► Is the first-person indexical unique in 
having a double meaning or does the 
same duality affect all indexicals? 
 
► How do we successfully communicate 
with a sentence containing an indexical if 
that indexical expresses different senses to 
the speaker and hearer? 
 
► How might a hearer attribute a first-
person thought containing a private exec-
utive sense to the speaker?  
 
My purpose now is to develop an account of 
indexicals along Fregean lines that will provide 
answers to the first three of these questions, 
pointing out that the answer to the first pro-
vides the material for answering the second and 
third. I will conclude with some brief remarks 
on answers to the fourth and fifth. 
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█  Generalizing Frege’s insight 
 
Standard accounts of indexicals are domi-
nated by a consumerist model of language ac-
cording to which the purpose of language is to 
communicate and semantics is a matter of in-
terpretive procedures. This model is explicit in 
the work of philosophers like David Kaplan, 
John Perry, and Ruth Millikan,15 and is virtually 
assumed in subsequent discussions.16  
The consumerist model can acknowledge 
that communicating requires thinking and 
that indexical expressions are vehicles for 
apprehending thoughts as well as conveying 
them to others. The interplay of indexical 
meaning with context is evident in both pro-
cesses. Suppose you tell me, 
 
(4)  I’ll give you this book if you remain sit-
ting there. 
 
I understand what you are saying only be-
cause I know who uttered the sentence, when 
and where it was uttered, and, perhaps, 
something about the your gestures and bodi-
ly orientation. To do this I must work from 
my grasp of the meanings of your “I”, “you”, 
“that book” and “there”, and my perception 
of relevant contextual parameters to the de-
termination of your referents using familiar 
semantic rules, e.g., that a token of “you” re-
fers to the addressee of an utterance. You re-
alize, in turn, that I am guided by such rules.  
The limits of consumerism are manifest 
when it is realized that utterances must be 
produced before they can be interpreted, and 
such production cannot begin without con-
ceptualizing the items we intend to communi-
cate about. Here too indexical meanings show 
their value. The meanings of “I”, “you”, “that 
book” and “there” in your uttering (4) might 
have been as instrumental in your picking out 
particular persons, an object, and a place as 
they were in mine. But you did not arrive at 
these identifications by doing what I did, that 
is, by first perceiving your own tokens and 
then interpreting them by recourse to the con-
text of utterance. These tokens were inputs of 
my interpretive process, but outputs of your 
executive conceptualizations. In particular, 
you did not identify through the modes of be-
ing a speaker or being an addressee, nor did you 
begin with a thought that a hearer might have 
entertained upon apprehending your utter-
ance of (4), e.g., namely, 
  
(5)  The speaker of (4) will give the addressee 
of (4) the speaker-indicated book if the 
addressee of (4) remains seated in the 
speaker-demonstrated place.  
 
or, even less likely, the one I probably 
ended up with,  
 
(6)  He’ll give me that book if I remain sit-
ting here. 
 
So, my identifying something by inter-
preting your utterance of (4) differs – in 
terms of cognitive procedure – from the ex-
ecutive identifications within the thinking 
that caused you to produce that utterance.17  
Again, suppose you listen to an audio re-
cording that you know was made on April 
10th, 2015, and hear a voice saying, “I am not 
here today”. You might identify the day re-
ferred to by employing the rule: 
 
Take the referent of a “today” token to be 
the day on which its utterance is encoded.  
 
However, if the person who made the re-
cording intended the hearer to interpret “to-
day” in terms of the hearer’s own temporal 
perspective, the relevant rule would be: 
 
Take the referent of a “today” token to be 
the day on which its utterance is processed.  
 
In either case, you do not identify a par-
ticular day as today in the manner the speak-
er did, for the latter did not pick out a dura-
tion as the day in which a particular utter-
ance occurred. None of us can think of a giv-
en day as being the day on which a certain 
utterance occurred without identifying that 
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utterance, but we can think, What lousy luck 
we’re having today, without considering any 
utterance whatever. Consequently, an inter-
pretive meaning for “today” on the order of,  
 
being the day on which utterance U of “to-
day” occurred [is encoded, processed, etc.]  
 
is not even similar to the concept, being 
today, that guides executive identification. 
This difference cannot be explained if we in-
sist that there is just one meaning governing 
both the production and interpretation of a 
“today” token. 
We can think indexically without saying 
or hearing anything at all, say, by admiring 
her, envying him, regretting what we did yes-
terday, intending to run over there, having 
now or never sentiments, locating objects and 
events by means of here, then, and beyond, 
etc. We can identify items as this tree, those 
books, or that hideous war, and recognize 
their status as being behind me, in this direc-
tion, and over there. We do not have to utter 
sentences or to try communicating with oth-
ers in order to think as we do. We can con-
ceptualize through indexical concepts quite 
apart from interpreting utterances or form-
ing intentions to communicate. Sometimes a 
speaker has no means of identification other 
than what an indexical provides, for instance, 
when a demonstrative like that represents 
the only way of picking out what suddenly 
looms into visual or auditory awareness: 
What is that?, or, when a kidnapped heiress 
locked in the trunk of a car thinks, It is quiet 
here now, without any other means of locat-
ing herself.18 
Three differences between executing and 
interpreting indexical identifications have 
been noted. First, while interpretation is ut-
terance-reflexive, execution is not. Second, 
tokens are causal inputs to interpretive iden-
tification but outputs of executive identifica-
tion. Third, while interpretation is subse-
quent to the interpreter’s perception of an 
utterance, executive thinking is not. Even if 
indexical tokens are conceived as mental rep-
resentations, the thinker who initiates an 
identification does not first become aware of 
these tokens and then interpret them by re-
course to some sort of context in which they 
occur. At best, such mental tokens occur 
simultaneously with the producer’s identifi-
cations, not antecedently as causal inputs.  
A fourth difference is this. One who exe-
cutes an indexical reference has room for a 
creative employment that an interpreter 
lacks. Interpreting someone’s “This book has 
been invaluable!” requires exploiting the 
meaning conventionally associated with 
“this”. Yet, within certain limits, the speaker 
has an option about which meaning to use, 
e.g., “That book has been invaluable”, to 
make the same point. Again, noticing a per-
son approaching in the distance I think: That 
person is running, but I might have thought 
instead, That man is running, or, He is run-
ning. Or, a modest person might prefer self-
congratulations in the second-person, You 
did wonderfully! rather than, I did wonderful-
ly! It is a fact about communication in gen-
eral that a speaker has a choice that is not 
there for the interpreter.  
A fifth difference is that to interpret an 
indexical one must already have cognitive ac-
cess to the referent, as suggested by my ap-
prehending (6) via an interpretation of (4). 
But a thinker might have no other means of 
identification other than what an indexical 
provides, for instance, when a demonstrative 
like that or a demonstrative phrase, that over 
there, represents the only way of picking out 
what suddenly looms into visual or auditory 
awareness.  
Consider the kidnapped heiress; her in-
dexical representations are autonomous in-
asmuch as their having the content they do 
does not depend upon her possessing other 
ways of distinguishing or describing what she 
is thinking about. In this sense she does not 
know what time it is since she cannot specify 
it in terms other than “now”. Yet, the very 
fact that she is able to draw a contrast, that 
she knows it is quiet now, as distinct from 
quiet then (say, when she was abducted, or 
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when the car was speeding down the road-
way), reveals that she is discriminating be-
tween her present temporal location and oth-
er times. More dramatically, suppose she were 
drugged and placed in a large, silent, fully 
darkened, weightlessness chamber; regaining 
consciousness, she finds herself floating, be-
wildered, with no idea where she is beyond 
what she thinks with It is quiet here now, a 
thought that would undoubtedly be true.  
Finally, while both executive and interpre-
tive identification are guided by indexical 
concepts, the difference in their procedures 
mandates a like difference in the concepts as-
sociated with one and the same indexical type. 
When my friend yells, “I am here” in response 
to my “Where are you?” I pinpoint his locale, 
but not by executing I or here identifications. I 
understand that with his “here” token, for in-
stance, my friend is referring to the place he 
occupies during his utterance, a locale that I 
likely identify as there. My understanding of 
how another’s “here” works in communica-
tion guides my resolution of his token, but 
that’s not what guided his own identification 
of his locale. If both speaker and interpreter 
were guided by one and the same indexical 
meaning we could not explain these differ-
ences in identificatory procedures.  
The upshot is that the meaning of an in-
dexical type utilized in executive identification 
must differ from the meaning used in inter-
pretation, and semantic duality must be rec-
ognized as an essential, perhaps distinguish-
ing, mark of indexical expressions. It follows 
that different indexical senses can be ex-
pressed by a token in the utterance of one and 
the same utterance, and that the latter express 
both executive and interpretive thoughts.19 
 
█  A perspectival account of indexical exe-
cution 
 
How are executive modes contextual? Ra-
ther than looking to contexts of utterance, a 
different approach locates the discriminating 
contextual factors within a speaker’s ante-
cedent psychological states, factors that are 
egocentric or perspectival in virtue of their 
relations to a speaker’s unique spatial or 
temporal standpoints. Thus, something is 
viewed as near because of its relative proxim-
ity to a speaker’s standpoint. One object is 
beyond another in virtue of its greater spatial 
or temporal distance from the thinker’s own 
here or now. The utterance-reflexivity so crit-
ical to interpretation is only one kind of con-
text-sensitivity; what we might call perspec-
tival-embedment is another.20 
A perspectival approach to understanding 
indexicals is nothing new, because everyone 
realizes that knowing the speaker’s position 
and spatial and temporal relationships is rel-
evant to the interpretation of indexicals. For 
example, if I utter,  
 
(7)  You should take your umbrella; it may 
rain here today. 
 
In addressing Jane in London in the after-
noon of July 24, 2016, I reveal my relations to 
a particular person, time, and place. I must be 
in London, addressing Jane, on July 24, 2016 
and only thus do I think of Jane as you, of 
London as here, and July 24, 2016 as today. 
My words are autobiographical, though bio-
graphical for my listeners, and Jane needs to 
understand this in interpreting my utterance. 
The same information is not conveyed by my 
assertion of, 
 
(8)  Jane should take her umbrella; it may 
rain in London on July 24, 2016, 
 
or,  
 
(9)  She should take her umbrella; it may 
rain there then. 
 
Even though, in both cases, I might be in 
the same position and identifying the very 
same person, place and time. Executive index-
ical thinking is also perspectival, not because it 
occurs from a particular spatial or temporal 
standpoint(s) – all thought occurs from the 
thinker’s unique standpoint – and not because 
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a speaker’s perspective is relevant to interpreta-
tion. Instead, indexical execution is perspectival 
because relations to this standpoint are consti-
tutive of the way a thinker conceptualizes the 
content, with the standpoint itself is manifested 
as the centerpoint of the speaker’s perspective.21  
At any given time, we are aware, in varying 
degrees, of a spatial and/or a temporal array of 
content or data. The most obvious arrays are 
comprised of sensory data, produced by the re-
action of our perceptual systems to physical in-
puts. But each modality of consciousness, 
whether auditory, visual, tactile, imaginary, 
dreamlike, memorial, proprioceptive, and so 
forth, is associated an array of data, and one 
might be simultaneously aware of distinct ar-
rays, as when one hears a melody while viewing 
a painting. The data within an array are partly 
individuated in terms of their spatial, temporal, 
or spatio-temporal locales or positions, each of 
which is either a volume, duration, a pair of 
such, or a sequence of such pairs, fixed by a dis-
tance, direction, and size of an immediate da-
tum relative to the centerpoint of the array. 
Within an event of perceptual awareness, 
it is more accurate to describe each datum as a 
vector, moreover, a force-vector, because it in-
volves transference of content from a position 
in an array to the centerpoint, more noticeable 
in auditory perception than in visual.22 Sounds 
are obvious force-vectors, but so are perceived 
colors and shapes, and their vector character is 
likely inherited from those of the physical in-
puts (I am neutral on what can count as a per-
spectival datum, though I certainly count sen-
sory shapes, colors, sounds, etc. as data, as well 
as afterimages). A perspectival array is nothing 
more than a dynamic spatial and/or temporal 
ordering of the data vis-a-vis the centerpoint. 
The vector character of the perspectival data 
is evident wherever there is a such an order-
ing, including in imagination, memory, and 
even in more contemplative states such as de-
ductive inference. 
Distinct contemporaneous perspectival 
arrays can be integrated into more com-
prehensive unities, a critical feature of behav-
ior that relies upon cues from one or more 
sensory modality, so that an agent might real-
ize that a visual there, say, converges with a 
tactile there. A maximally integrated perspec-
tive during any interval, if there is such, is the 
totality of immediate data co-presented in a 
single episode of awareness. How compre-
hensive it is depends on the extent of an 
agent’s co-awarenesses through distinct mo-
dalities, but, on the content side, the unity of 
consciousness is a matter of membership in a 
single perspectival array. A maximal array 
partly constitutes the occurrent mental life of 
the agent at a time, and while centered, this 
mental life extends throughout the array. 
While there is no indexical conceptualiza-
tion without perspective, there is nothing “in-
dexical” about perspectival arrays as such. Ar-
rays are given without any effort on our part. 
But indexicality is a creature of conceptualiza-
tion and comes into existence only with at-
tempts to conceptualize experiential content in 
terms of the positions within arrays.23  
Sometimes, spatial position serves to dis-
tinguish, as reflected by the use of “you” in,  
 
(10) You, you, you, and you can leave, but 
you stay!  
 
or the demonstrative phrases in, 
 
(11) That ship [hearing a horn] is this ship 
[pointing through a window]. 
 
even though an auditory vector enables 
the initial demonstrative identification of the 
ship while a visual vector enables the latter. 
Sometimes, temporal factors are prominent 
role, as in anaphoric reference expressed 
through “the former”, “the latter”, “the pre-
vious one”, or, when through a single window 
a person thinks the non-trivial,  
 
(12) That ship [observing the bow go by] is 
that ship [observing the stern go past]. 
 
Discrimination in terms of position is only 
half the story. Executive indexical identifica-
tion also depends on how a thinker classifies 
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the identified item. I can be in London on July 
24, 2016 without identifying either the place 
or time as here and today, but to think what is 
typically expressed with (7) I must conceive 
my own standpoint as being here and the day 
as today. Even if Jane keeps the very same po-
sition within my perspective, I might have 
identified her demonstratively as she rather 
than as you, or as that woman. Executive in-
dexical concepts guide thinking, and as with 
interpretive concepts, each imposes con-
straints upon what can be singled out. Most 
constraints are a matter of spatial and tem-
poral relations between identifier and identi-
fied, as with (7), but others deal with intrinsic 
sortals, e.g., only events or intervals can be 
then, and only a man can be a that man. 
Constraints are vague for deictic uses of 
pronouns like he, she, or it, and the demon-
stratives that, those, beyond, etc. Perhaps noth-
ing more than position distinct from the cen-
terpoint is imposed, though the this/that, the-
se/those, and here/then contrasts suggest that 
relative proximity is also a factor. Similarly, in 
non-demonstrative uses of I, here, and now, 
what is identified is located within a four di-
mensional array of space-time positions that 
includes the centerpoint, while I carries the 
additional constraint that the identifier is the 
same as the identified. The indexical you, on 
the other hand, restricts the temporal location 
of the identified item to times that are simul-
taneous with or subsequent to the identifier’s 
temporal locus. Also, what is picked out 
through you must be something that the user 
believes is susceptible to communicational in-
fluence, though it need not actually be so sus-
ceptible. Thus, despite an executor’s leeway as 
to which indexical concept to employ in con-
ceptualizing the data, once a choice is made, 
anarchy is not the rule. 
While what is identified or thought about 
indexically need not itself be an immediate 
datum of direct awareness, access to it is 
parasitic upon some such datum. When I 
gaze at a dot on a map and think,  
 
(13) That city is north of Prague.  
I identify a particular city, say, Berlin, but 
I am directly aware of the dot. The latter is 
the index of my executive act, namely, what I 
explicitly “latch on to” in the course of 
picking something out24 and of which I am 
directly aware.25 Each index is an indivi-
duated item at a position, or, in the case of a 
dynamic referent such as a person moving 
across my field of vision, an item(s) at an 
ordering of positions. Identification is direct 
when the identified item is the index, as 
when I compare two colors in my visual field 
and think this one is darker than that one. 
The identified item is then itself positioned 
within the perspective.  
Identification is deferred when made 
indirectly through an index, as with my 
reference to Berlin in (13) in terms of the dot 
on the map. The dot is not a logical subject in 
the thought I express with (13), though it 
might well be identified indexically in a 
distinct thought, e.g.,  
 
(14) The city represented by that dot is north 
of Prague  
 
to which I am committed by virtue of my 
deferred identification in (13). Both direct 
and deferred identification are perhaps 
present in,  
 
(15)  His mother is rich,  
 
which I think while picking out a man in 
the room through His. Even tokens of a simple 
indexical can reflect a deferred identification, 
for example, remembering that this has a nice 
beach while noticing another dot on the same 
map. Similarly, “today” might have deferred 
uses insofar as the index of a today thought is 
a much briefer interval, or again, “we” for one 
who is speaking of a group only some of 
whose members are present. A more difficult 
example is,  
 
(16)  I am parked out back, 
 
which is most likely be elliptical for,  
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(17)  My car is parked out back.  
 
If so, then “I” in (16) embodies a deferred 
identification, for just as it is not claimed that 
a dot on a map has a nice beach, so too, I do 
not view myself as parked out back.  
Executive identification is secured through 
an orienting relation or «relation of conti-
guity»26 linking the identified item to the 
index, a relation the executor must grasp. In 
the example of (14), Berlin is related to the dot 
through a representational relation, and I 
realize this in thinking (13). Sometimes a 
causal relation is involved, as in, This fellow is 
clever, having just read an essay on indexicals, 
namely, the relation of authoring such and 
such paper. A relation of temporal precedence 
is evident in the use of “yesterday” and a part-
to-whole relation may be relevant for thinking 
that Today has been rainy or This town is 
boring, where, the indices associated with 
“Today” and “this town” are temporal parts of 
more extended entities. The orientation of an 
identified item is a relational property deter-
mined by its orienting relation to an index, 
e.g., being the city represented by that dot. 
When identification is direct, the orienting 
relation is identity and the orientation is the 
property of being identical to the index.  
More formally, suppose that o is a posi-
tion falling within a region occupied by an 
agent Y and m is a modality of consciousness 
(visual, auditory, etc.). If o is manifest as a 
centerpoint o within Y’s awareness, then o 
consists of either a time (duration) t, a place 
(volume) v, a pair (t,v), or, when the agent is 
aware of itself in motion, an ordering of such 
pairs <(t,v), (t,v), …>. The pair (o,m) de-
termines a perspectival array for Y. Letting 
“p” be a schema for a representation of any 
position within (o,m), then each datum d(p) 
within (o,m) may be described as d as located 
at p, viz., d-at-p, or, better, to secure its vec-
tor character, d-from-p. 
Let X be an item identified by means of 
an executive indexical concept k and an index 
d(p) within an array (o,m). If Y’s identifica-
tion of X is deferred, then X is picked out by 
means of a relational property R[d(p)] fixed 
by an orienting relation R linking X to d(p). 
The mode of presentation, can then be repre-
sented by k(R[d(p)]).  
While k, p, R, d(p), R[d(p)], are all com-
ponents of k(R[d(p)]), they need not them-
selves be identified by the thinker who em-
ploys the mode. If they are, as in that boy-
friend of Emma’s where “Emma” is itself iden-
tified, then the mode is complex. If not, it is 
simple. When identification is direct, the ori-
enting relation R is identity and the mode 
can be represented equally well by k([d(p)]). 
All executive modes are “object-dependent” 
in the sense that their existence depends up-
on the existence of the indices. Modes of di-
rect identification are also referent-
dependent in the sense that they would not 
exist apart from what satisfies them, their 
referents, but the modes of deferred identifi-
cation have a being apart from the items that 
might satisfy them. A few examples illustrate 
the pattern of analysis. Consider my use of 
the second person pronoun in uttering  
 
(7)  You should take your umbrella; it may 
rain here today.  
 
while talking on the phone to Jane. If the 
index is the sound of a voice coming from the 
phone’s receiver at point p, viz., [sound at p], 
and the orienting relation is the property of 
producing the sound at p, and my I employ 
the executive you concept, then my second-
person individuating mode is,  
 
you (producing [sound at p]). 
 
Alternatively, if (7) reflects a direct se-
cond-person identification, say, if I am look-
ing at Jane while addressing her so that Jane 
herself – from the position she occupies in 
my visual array – is the index, then my iden-
tifying mode would fit this schema: 
 
you ([Jane at p]). 
 
If, in speaking to Jane over the phone, I 
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formed the thought: 
 
(9)  She should take her umbrella; it may 
rain there then 
 
the identifying mode is 
 
She (producing [sound at p]) 
  
The indexicals “now” and “here” may in-
dicate the two parameters of a centerpoint, 
but they can also be used to demonstrate 
other locales, e.g., “Napoleon realized that it 
is now time to attack” or “Jonathan is right 
here [pointing to the corner]”.  
A demonstrative use of “here” occurs in (7), 
picking out a place that includes the center-
point, where the mode of presentation is likely, 
  
here (being a city that includes [v]). 
 
The mode associated with “today” in  
 
(18) While today we practice, tomorrow we 
play for keeps,  
 
might be, 
 
today (being a day that includes [t]) 
 
where the index t is the time of the utter-
ance. Similarly, the correlated mode of my 
“tomorrow” could be, 
  
tomorrow (being the day immediately suc-
ceeding the day that includes [t]) 
 
If we balk at accepting volumes or dura-
tions in themselves as immediate data and 
insist that an additional qualitative element d 
be included, say, a colored expanse, a sound, 
or an emotion, then the immediate data as-
sociated with my “today” can be depicted as 
d(t), and the corresponding mode is, 
 
today (being a day that includes [d(t)]) 
 
Similar adjustments can be made for 
“here” and “tomorrow”. These examples 
show how executive indexical identifications 
occur in virtue of an item’s relation to a per-
spectival array, even though that array is not 
itself distinguished or conceptualized within 
that thought.  
Indexical types can function as common 
nouns on this view. A person can be a she, a 
you, or a that man, just as a certain interval 
can be a now. But such an indexical status is, 
at best, a relational property of an item pos-
sessed only in relation to an experiencing 
subject who distinguishes it as such. Unless 
someone addresses you, you do not have the 
status of being you. A sound is not a this un-
less noticed as such, a person is a not a she 
save through demonstrative identification, 
and a square foot of Antarctica can exist 
without ever being here or there. No object in 
the external world is intrinsically a you, a she, 
a this, or a here. Indexical status is extrinsic 
rather than intrinsic, relative rather than ab-
solute, and contingent rather than essen-tial. 
It can endure for a bit insofar as an act execu-
tive indexical thinking can endure over an 
interval, so that two tokens of “I” in a given 
utterance can be associated with one and the 
same mode. Also, because data can move 
within a single perspectival array then a sin-
gle dynamic this, that, he, etc. can be associ-
ated with an ordering of positions. But per-
spectival arrays are individuated by the men-
tal events which they constitute, and since 
the orientations of items fade with their per-
spectival arrays, indexical status is ephemer-
al. Its esse is percipi.27 
 
█  Back to Dr. Lauben 
 
I have contended that the executive first-
person identification is not utterance-
reflexive; the mode employed cannot require 
the thinker to first identify an utterance and 
then determine its author. Similarly, it cannot 
require the thinker to identify an event of 
first-person thinking as Tyler Burge suggested 
in writing that the referent of a use of an “I” 
concept is fixed by the rule that «the referent 
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is the author of the occurrence of thought 
containing application of the I concept».28  
If this were the rule that guides the execu-
tor then he or she would first have to identify 
the episode of thinking in which the I con-
cept is applied in order to apply the I concept. 
Again, this gets things backwards; the I con-
cept is instrumental in the initial self-
identification and the apprehension, not 
something employed subsequent to a first-
person thought. It is primitive in the sense of 
not containing another singular sense as a 
component, whereas any mode based on 
Burge’s rule would be complex since a sense 
is needed to identify the thought.  
What account can be provided for the ex-
ecutive first-person modes?  
Two factors are essential; the executive I 
concept and an index. Though perhaps prim-
itive or indefinable, the executive I concept 
comes with its own constraints, for only an 
experiencer, moreover, a conscious being 
identical to the identifier, can be identified 
through the executive first person concept. 
Cleaving to the analysis given, what is the in-
dex of an executive first-person mode? Recall 
that Dr. Lauben thought, 
 
 (1)  I have been wounded  
 
and thereby identified the person or or-
ganism that he is. Was Dr. Lauben himself – 
the person or organism – the index of his 
identification?  
If so, then the orienting relation is identi-
ty and the executive mode is, 
 
I ([Dr. Lauben at (t,v)]) 
 
First-person identification would then be 
direct, not deferred. However, on a Fregean 
view, it is implausible to take the index to be 
Dr. Lauben himself, for if we cannot counte-
nance Mount Etna as a component of our 
thoughts we should draw the same conclu-
sion as regards ourselves, whether we are en-
during organisms or four-dimensional enti-
ties comprised of person-stages. Such entities 
are not present within perspectival arrays, at 
least not in their entirety. Unless we are will-
ing to describe both index and person as an 
enduring soul that is wholly present in a sin-
gle conscious act, the hypothesis that the in-
dex is the whole person or organism is not 
very promising. 
So here’s a different proposal. The index 
is a perspectival array, perhaps the maximally 
integrated array constituting a given episode 
of awareness.29 An array is always there at 
every episode of indexical awareness, howev-
er thick or thin it might be, for immediate 
data and the associated reactions exist only 
as part of a unified whole. Just as there is an 
awareness of individual data-vectors, so too, 
there is an awareness of their perspectival as-
semblage, and while this awareness is typical-
ly marginal, it becomes salient in first-person 
thinking. It is the basis for thinking of the 
“me here and now” of which I, and I alone, 
am directly aware. 
Accordingly, letting “C(t,v)” represent an 
array centered on locus (t,v), a candidate for 
Dr. Lauben’s executive I-mode is this: 
 
I ([C(t,v)]) 
 
So understood, what Dr. Lauben identi-
fied as “I” is identical to the index C(t,v), and 
her first-person identification remains direct. 
This analysis works provided a maximal ar-
ray – a “self” of relatively short duration - is 
an entity that can be identified and referred 
to with “I”. This minimal self may be part of 
the temporally extended being that I am, an 
idea that may initially seem outlandish, 
though not if a four-dimensional analysis of 
persisting organisms is taken seriously.30 On 
the other hand, if Jane thinks of herself as 
something that persists, as in 
 
(19) I have been lecturing in Paris for twelve 
years 
 
or,  
 
(20) I am gradually losing weight  
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then, on the assumption that what is iden-
tified is not an object of direct awareness, her 
identification is deferred rather than direct. 
The index is still the maximal array at the 
time, but since identification is deferred the 
orientation differs. While the persisting I is 
not identical to the index, it can be thought to 
“have” or be “partly constituted by” the index, 
and the relevant mode of presentation is rep-
resentable as,  
 
I (having [C(t,v)]) 
 
where “having” expresses orienting rela-
tion, namely, a compositional tie between the 
maximal array and a persisting I.  
With these proposals, we capture two 
ways of thinking of oneself in first-person 
terms; as a momentary self – the me here now 
– and as a persisting organism to which such 
momentary unities belong. The former is di-
rect, the latter deferred, but in both cases the 
guiding concept is the executive I-ness con-
cept and the index is a perspectival array.31 
Moreover, we can see that just as nothing 
is intrinsically a this or a you, so too, nothing 
is intrinsically an I. Insofar as being a self is 
nothing more than to be identified qua a 
first-person concept, then there are no intrin-
sic or natural “selves.” The self, just as much 
as the I, lives only within episodes of self-
consciousness.32 
We have, at last, provided an account of 
Dr. Lauben’s primitive, private mode of self-
presentation mentioned by Frege. Whether 
we describe it as I ([C(t,v)]) or I (having 
[C(t,v)]), it is first-personal because of the 
classification it imposes, primitive in having 
no other sense as a component, and private 
because only the identified experiencer can 
use C(t,v) as an index. 
 
█  Indexical communication and quasi-
indexical attributions 
 
Can we square the foregoing duality theo-
ry of indexicals with Frege’s claims about the 
objectivity and communicability of thoughts? 
Consider communication. If Dr. Lauben suc-
cessfully communicated with Leo Peter in ut-
tering (1), it does not follow that they shared 
identical thoughts. It is enough they thought 
similar things about the same referent, and 
this can be achieved through a coordination 
of thoughts that falls short of identity. Since 
there are two meanings associated with every 
indexical type, executive and interpretive, 
communication with indexicals requires only 
a systematic coordination of thoughts, and 
competence with indexicals is a matter of 
mastering this coordination. You succeeded 
in communication to me with 
 
 (4)  I’ll give you this book if you remain sit-
ting there. 
 
even though the thought I ended up with 
is better expressed by, 
 
 (6)  He’ll give me that book if I remain sit-
ting here. 
 
Our communication is successful because 
our distinct indexical senses and thoughts are 
coordinated in such a way that I am caused 
to think an analogous proposition concern-
ing your referents.33 
Unless I am exceptionally autistic, I may 
also realize that your (4) also conveys infor-
mation about your own thoughts. Because I 
understand the executive meaning of the 
first-person pronoun, I can surmise that you 
are thinking about yourself in a first-person 
way. Indexicals are always biographical to the 
hearer, yielding information not only about 
the speaker’s spatial and temporal positions 
and relationships, but also about his or her 
own conceptualization, as evidenced by an 
ascription like,  
 
(21) He said that he himself will give me that 
book if the person he himself is address-
ing remains sitting there 
 
where “he himself” and “there” are quasi-
indicators used to attribute indexical thoughts 
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to subject. There is no identity between what I 
express with the subordinate clause and the 
thought that prompted your utterance of (4), 
for the embedded “he himself” does not express 
to me what your “I” expressed to you. There is 
coordination, however, since I understand the 
sort of mode you employ in identifying yourself 
even though I do not use a mode of that sort to 
identify you.34 
Are indexical executive thoughts objec-
tive? If “objective” requires public accessibil-
ity then private indexical thoughts are not 
objective. However, Frege held that thoughts 
are objective inasmuch as they exist and have 
their truth-values independently of our 
thinking.35 If indexical thoughts exist inde-
pendently of our thinking them, there is no 
barrier to their being truth-valued inde-
pendently of our thinking. My own view is 
that executive indexical thoughts, like execu-
tive indexical senses, exist only when appre-
hended, though their truth-values are inde-
pendent of our judgments. Whether they 
constitute an exception to Frege’s claim 
about the objectivity of thoughts is a matter 
for another paper. 
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